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INTRODUCTION 
Business trusts have been commonly used in the United States as an 
organizational form for over 100 years.1 Historically, entrepreneurs used 
business trusts, which evolved from private donative trusts, to escape 
regulatory and tax requirements imposed on corporations.2 Today, 
business trusts are narrowly used in specialized niches, such as structured 
finance transactions and the setting up of mutual funds.3 Yet, as 
corporations have ascended as the dominant organizational form in the 
United States for operating a business, the use of business trusts has 
stagnated. By contrast, business trusts have enjoyed a resurgence in neo-
innovative economies such as Singapore. This disparity regarding the 
prevalence of business trusts as an organizational form in the United 
States as compared to abroad could prove enlightening for future 
economic ventures, especially foreign investment. For instance, why are 
business trusts gaining popularity in Singapore and other Asian markets? 
And, why have business trusts generally been overlooked in the United 
States outside of mutual funds and employee pension funds?4 This Article 
seeks to address these questions by discussing and comparing business 
trusts in the United States with those being used in Singapore.5 Beyond 
providing mere descriptive accounts of business trusts in these two 
countries, this Article will consider the transportability of key concepts of 
Singapore business trusts to American business trust law and usage. In 
 
 1. See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment 
Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 424–28 (1988) (elucidating the origins and history of the 
Massachusetts business trust). 
 2. See Lee-ford Tritt & Ryan Scott Teschner, Re-Imagining the Business Trust as a Sustainable 
Business Form, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2019). 
 3. John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 
YALE L.J. 165, 171 (1997). In addition, federal law imposes trust form on employee pension funds. See 
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), all assets of an employee benefit plan 
shall be held in trust by one or more trustees.”). The Code equates “employee benefit plan” with 
“employee pension benefit plan.” Id. § 1002(3). 
 4. In answering these questions, it should be noted that business trusts seem to have been 
understudied and not widely understood among both business law and trust law scholars and practitioners. 
Langbein, supra note 3, at 188 (“From our understanding that the trust and the corporation are competitors 
for organizing commercial activity, it follows that we should in principle be able to specify why one or 
the other prevails in a particular setting. I am not yet able to do this.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial 
Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. L. 559, 560 (2003) (“There are not . 
. . clear answers to the fundamental question of whether trusts are a better form of business organization 
than corporations or partnerships.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 
U. ILL. REV. 31, 33 (2005) (noting a “stunning lack of familiarity” with business trusts in legal 
scholarship); see also id. at 44 (“Why does [the] trust continue to abide as a form of business organization 
even after we developed enabling corporation law? Why did enabling corporate codes emerge when we 
already had highly flexible trust law? Why does corporation trounce trust for the organization of operating 
enterprises?”). 
 5. Singapore is an appropriate situs for a comparative analysis because of its viable use of 
business trusts as well as its status and importance as one of the leading financial centers in the world. 
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addition, this Article will be mindful that American institutional and 
cultural business contexts (for example, historical use and the emerging 
sustainability movement6), as well as American trust jurisprudence, may 
limit the applicability of these key concepts in the United States. 
In the modern United States, business trusts have been mostly 
overlooked—in favor of corporations—by entrepreneurs who wish to 
start an operating business.7 However, business trusts have seen major 
success overseas. Take Singapore, for example. Singapore provides for 
organization in both the corporate form8 and the business trust form under 
a common law, code-based system like the United States. Yet, even with 
the competition of the corporate form, the business trust remains a popular 
business form in Singapore.9 Along with Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), business trusts account for a majority of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) on the Singapore Exchange.10 Something must prompt 
Singaporean entrepreneurs to select the business trust form over the 
corporate form.  
 
 6. See generally Lee-ford Tritt & Ryan Scott Teschner, Amazon Delivers Diversity: 
Geographical & Social Influences on Corporate Embeddedness, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2019) 
(discussing the interplay of social consciousness and corporate embeddedness in the context of newer, 
sustainability-focused companies like Amazon). 
 7. Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 31, 34. Sitkoff notes that business trusts are largely ignored in modern 
legal scholarship. Id. at 33. This Article seeks to contribute to Sitkoff’s call for research in this area. 
 8. The Singapore corporate entity differs from its counterpart used in the United States, but the 
issue of entity choice in Singapore is roughly approximate to the issue of entity choice in the United States 
due to the existence of similar code-based, common law systems in both countries. 
 9. Generally speaking, business trusts are likely used more readily in Singapore because the 
structure, law, and investment strategies concerning Singapore business trusts reduce uncertainties on 
many different levels. See infra Section II.B.2; see also Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and 
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 211–21 (1950). 
 10. Singapore’s 2017 IPO Market Dominated by Trusts’ Strong Performance, DELOITTE (Nov. 
30, 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/sg/en/pages/audit/articles/sg-2017-ipo-market-press-release.html 
[https://perma.cc/C5X7-A9CB] (“Proceeds from the overall Trusts market has improved from S$0.3 
billion raised in 2015 to S$1.9 billion raised in 2016. To date, 20 Trusts have listed since the beginning 
of 2013, creating market vibrancy and raising a total of S$13.9 billion.”); Angela Tan, REITs, Business 
Trusts, F&B to Drive IPOs on SGX in 2018, BUS. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:50 AM), 
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/reits-business-trusts-fb-to-drive-ipos-on-sgx-in-
2018; Angela Tan, Reits, Business Trusts to Continue to Drive IPOs on SGX: PwC Report, STRAITS TIMES 
(Jan. 3, 2018, 1:21 PM) [hereinafter Tan, PwC Report], 
https://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/reits-business-trusts-to-continue-to-drive-
ipos-on-sgx-pwc-report [https://perma.cc/7FPM-YCAN] (“The year 2017 was a brilliant one for IPOs in 
Singapore. With the market upturn, we see that real estate investment trusts (REITs) and business trusts 
(BTs) continue to dominate the market making up 88 per cent of total funds raised . . . .”); see also 
Aradhana Aravindan & Anshuman Daga, Singtel’s NetLink Makes Tepid Debut; More Singapore IPOs in 
the Pipeline, REUTERS (July 19, 2017, 7:18 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/netlink-trust-
listing/singtels-netlink-makes-tepid-debut-more-singapore-ipos-in-pipeline-idINKBN1A411D 
[https://perma.cc/FAP3-YQX6] (“In recent years, SGX has become an attractive destination for 
companies to list their global assets by way of REITS or business trusts, as yields of as much as 6-7 
percent draw in strong participation from retail and institutional investors amid relatively low interest 
rates.”). 
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An examination of why entrepreneurs in Singapore are choosing the 
business trust as an organizational form can inform business practices in 
America, and perhaps even provide a path for evolution.11 It should be 
noted, however, that there are some inherent risks—including unintended 
and unforeseen consequences—when expanding a successful construct 
developed in a distinct business ecosystem and transplanting it into 
another.12 The logic of the transferred legal concept may have a 
momentum of its own that distorts the principles and practices within the 
new context. Nevertheless, the legal and economic climates of Singapore 
and the United States are similar enough to suggest that a comparative 
review of Singapore and U.S. business trusts may provide valuable 
insights for American entrepreneurs. 
Accordingly, this Article is organized as follows: Part I provides a 
basic understanding of business trusts in the United States. Next, Part II 
explores the differences between business trusts in the United States and 
those in Singapore. Finally, Part III discusses how historical and cultural 
influences may have shaped the success—or lack thereof—of the 
business trust form in Singapore and in the United States. 
I.   A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS TRUSTS 
To properly compare U.S. and Singapore business trusts, our analysis 
must begin with a basic overview of American private and business trust 
law. 
A.   Traditional Concepts of Private Trusts 
In the United States, a trust is traditionally perceived as a private 
donative trust. In essence, a private donative trust creates two roles in 
asset ownership: a legal titleholder and an equitable titleholder.13 A settlor 
is an individual or entity that transfers certain property to a trust, while a 
trustee holds legal title to the trust property and the beneficiaries are 
entitled to an equitable interest in the trust property. 
A marked characteristic of trust law is the flexibility that comes with a 
settlor’s gift to a trust.14 This flexibility is a product of the foundational 
tenet of trust law: effectuating the settlor’s intent.15 Thus, a settlor is 
 
 11. See Alchian, supra note 9, at 219. 
 12. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and 
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 655–57 (2002); see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974). 
 13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 14. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 32. 
 15. Id.; John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1109 
(2004); see Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories 
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granted wide latitude in altering the numerous default rules that make up 
trust law.16 The primary caveats to this flexibility are aimed at preventing 
public policy offenses, such as trusts designed for illegal or capricious 
purposes.17 In general, however, private trust law is primarily focused on 
facilitating donative freedom.18 
Despite retaining legal ownership, a trustee holds the trust property for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries.19 As a result, the trustee owes the 
beneficiaries a fiduciary duty to administer the trust property in 
accordance with the trust agreement.20 This fiduciary duty is fundamental 
to trust law and has been thoroughly developed in trust law scholarship.21 
A final characteristic of trusts worth mentioning here is that a trust is a 
separate entity from any party involved in the creation or administration 
of the trust.22 In other words, the same party may be a settlor, trustee, a 
beneficiary (or, any combination of those). However, no party is the 
trust—once formed, the trust exists in complete independence from the 
other players.23 This distinct existence affects the legal treatment of trusts, 
particularly in regard to trust assets. For example, despite the trustee 
having legal title to the trust property, a trustee’s personal creditors cannot 
reach the assets of a trust. In the same vein, the settlor’s creditors are 
usually precluded from asserting claims over trust property. In short, the 
separation of the trust from the parties creating it is an important and 
unique feature of trust law that underlies the attractiveness of private 
donative trusts.24 
 
Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 288–90 (2010); Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches 
from the Trenches of America’s Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 752–53 (2014) 
[hereinafter Tritt, Trust Wars]. 
 16. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 32. 
 17. Tritt, Trust Wars, supra note 15, at 753 n.47.  
 18. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 32. 
 19. Austin Wakerman Scott, The Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521, 521 (1935); 
see also William F. Walsh, Nature of Equitable Rights and Equitable Title, 18 GEO. L.J. 36, 39 (1929) 
(juxtaposing the equitable ownership that trust beneficiaries possess with the legal title possessed by the 
trustee). 
 20. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 32. 
 21. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default 
Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005) (discussing the effect of social norms on fiduciary duties); John H. 
Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest, 114 YALE L.J. 929 
(2005) (underscoring the importance of the duty of loyalty in trust law). 
 22. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 33. 
 23. See id. (discussing the partitioning and protective features of trust law). 
 24. Id.; see also Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 438 (1998) (addressing the importance of asset 
protection in trust law); Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2588 (2011) (noting the asset protection that results from trusts being legally 
separate from the creating parties). 
5
Tritt and Teschner: Business Trusts in Neo-Innovative Economies
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
740 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88 
B.   Business Trusts in the United States25 
For over a century, business trusts have been a viable form of 
organization in the United States26 Business trusts were more popular at 
their inception—when state incorporation laws were prohibitively strict 
for business owners27—than they are today because of their flexibility, 
both financially and legally.28 Mutual funds, royalty trusts, and other asset 
securitization entities make up the majority of business trusts today, 
which still take advantage of the flexibility that business trusts offer.29 
As opposed to the historically cumbersome incorporation process, 
business trusts can be created through a simple trust agreement.30 
Through the trust agreement, property is conveyed to a trustee who holds 
and manages the property in a way that generates income for the 
beneficiaries.31 This conveyance of property grants the trustee full legal 
title and management rights in the property.32 The beneficiaries of a 
business trust, or “unitholders,”33 are made up of persons who hold 
certificates issued by the trustee.34 The certificates operate like shares of 
stock in a corporation: they entitle the unitholder to share in the income 
and proceeds of the trust as well as to transfer the shares in accordance 
with the trust agreement.35 Thus, when people choose a business trust to 
form a profit-generating association, they pay an investment amount to a 
trustee. The trustee then holds the funds for the purpose specified in the 
trust agreement while the investors—now beneficiaries—hold 
transferable interests in the revenue generated by the trustee’s 
management.36 
 
 25. For an in-depth analysis of how business trusts serve as a vehicle for sustainability-focused 
entrepreneurs in the United States to attain their organizational and social goals, see Tritt & Teschner, 
supra note 2, at 47–54. 
 26. See Jones et al., supra note 1, at 425–28. 
 27. See id. at 426 (“[B]usiness trusts were attractive because they provided an alternative to 
corporations which could be organized only pursuant to the restrictive state corporate statute.”). 
 28. See Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the limited liability, entity shielding, 
capital lock-in, tradeable shares, and legal personhood that business trusts historically offered business 
owners). 
 29. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 171. 
 30. Wheeler A. Rosenbalm, Comment, The Massachusetts Trust, 31 TENN. L. REV. 471, 471 
(1964). 
 31. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146 (1924). 
 32. See Goldwater v. Oltman, 292 P. 624, 627 (Cal. 1930). 
 33. The Business Trusts Act defines a “unit” as a “share in the beneficial ownership in the trust 
property of the business trust.” BUSINESS TRUSTS ACT ch. 31A, § 1 (Sing. 2005). A “unitholder” is “a 
person who holds units in a business trust.” Id. Thus, unitholders are equivalent to shareholders in a 
corporation, and are the beneficiaries of the business trust. 
 34. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 146. 
 35. Id. at 146–47. 
 36. This entire organizational process can happen without the involvement of government actors 
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As is apparent from their formation and management, business trusts 
are much like their common law counterpart, the private donative trust. 
Business trusts offer settlors the same flexibility and freedom in designing 
their organization as do private trusts.37 Additionally, both types of trusts 
provide trustees with legal title and beneficiaries with a beneficial 
interest.38 Further, the roles of the trustee and beneficiaries are set forth 
in a trust agreement in both private trusts and business trusts.39 Finally—
and perhaps most importantly—both private trusts and business trusts 
have distinct legal status from those involved in their creation.40 
There are, however, several legally significant differences between 
private and business trusts. Some scholars and courts have even noted that 
“the only resemblance [a business trust] bears to an ordinary trust is that 
the word ‘trust’ happens to have been chosen as the generic term to 
describe” the association.41 First, the settlor of a private donative trust 
conveys property to the trustee without expecting compensation, while a 
business trust settlor is paid for the conveyance of assets.42 Second, a 
business trust does not collect property with the ultimate intent of 
distribution, as does a private donative trust. Rather, a business trust 
obtains property for the purpose of continuing to conduct a profitable 
business.43 Third, a business trust is created on a fundamental contract 
theory between the trustee and the settlor(s), while private trusts are 
founded upon the settlor’s gift rather than a contract.44 Fourth, while 
private and business trust agreements describe the trust assets and duties 
of the trustee, the business trust agreement must also provide for “the 
permissible business activities of the trust.”45 Finally, and unsurprisingly, 
 
because common law principles help to govern the formation and execution of the business trust 
agreement. See Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 40. 
 37. Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 325 (2001) (“[B]usiness trusts could be viewed as the epitome of promoters’ 
freedom. Trusts allow promoters to design their organization any way they wish subject only to the 
pressures and judgments of the markets.”). 
 38. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 40. 
 39. Hecht, 265 U.S. at 146. 
 40. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 563–65 (discussing the use of trusts as separate entities, 
like special purpose vehicles, by companies looking to complete their structured finance goals). 
 41. See, e.g., Jim Walter Inv’rs v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975). 
 42. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 562. 
 43. See id. at 559–60 (identifying the “widespread” use of business trusts in modern economy, like 
the financing of mortgages, credit card, and student loan debt); Thomas E. Plank, The Bankruptcy Trust 
as a Legal Person, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251, 258 (2000) (“The business trustee uses the assets of 
the business to operate a business.”). 
 44. Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust, 
88 A.L.R.3d 704 § 2 (1978 & Supp. 2001). In fact, private trust agreements need not even be written; they 
operate as a function of the gift to one person for the benefit of another person. See Tritt & Teschner, 
supra note 2, at 40 n.238. 
 45. Plank, supra note 43, at 258. 
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the settlors of a business trust are usually the beneficiaries.46 In contrast, 
private trust law generally requires parties other than or in addition to the 
settlor to be beneficiaries of the trust.47 Finally, business trusts are taxed 
as businesses, whereas private trusts are taxed as trusts.48 
Because common law principles permeated business trust formation 
and management, business trusts faced many legal uncertainties, 
including issues of standing and organizational registration.49 In response, 
states began passing statutes that codified the regulation of business 
trusts.50 Now, business trusts are governed by the state laws of the trust’s 
situs. These laws—although varying significantly across states—offer 
business trust owners more certainty regarding the rights and liabilities of 
their trusts.51  
1.   Delaware Statutory Trust Act 
As with most organizational forms, business trusts are most commonly 
created under Delaware law.52 Though the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity 
Act will be used later in this Article for comparative purposes, it is still 
informative to briefly discuss the Delaware Statutory Trust Act of 1988 
(DSTA) because of the number of business trusts formed in Delaware.53 
The DSTA eliminated several common law principles in an effort to 
“recognize expressly the statutory trust as an alternative form of business 
association.”54 The DSTA requires that a business trust be operated in 
some manner that generates profit.55 However, any legal business, 
whether or not labeled for-profit, satisfies this “doing business” 
 
 46. This best illustrates the pure profitability function of the business trust: The settlors convey 
assets to the trust with the intent of receiving a personal return on that conveyance. 
 47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 43 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). See also Morsman v. 
Comm’r, 90 F.2d 18, 23–24 (8th Cir. 1937) (denying the existence of a trust when the settlor was also 
trustee and only ascertainable beneficiary). 
 48. See infra Section II.C.1 (discussing the taxation of U.S. business trusts).  
 49. See Chermside, supra note 44, at 719–30. 
 50. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation under Section 
36(a) of the Investment Fund Company Act of 1940, 54 KAN. L. REV. 251, 293 (2005). 
 51. See Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 42. 
 52. See Jared W. Speier, Clarifying the Business Trust in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Restatement 
Test, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1065, 1075 (2016) (“The foremost statute regarding business trusts is the Delaware 
Statutory Trust Act of 1988.”). 
 53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–3824 (2019). The Delaware Statutory Trust Act was 
originally known as the Delaware Business Trusts Act but was renamed to avoid confusion with the 
meaning of the term “trust” as used in the U.S. Code. Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned: How the 
Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's General 
Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 799 n.25 (2008) (citing 73 Del. Laws 238 (2002)). 
 54. See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., BALOTTI AND FINKELSTEIN’S DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.2 (3d ed. 2019). 
 55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(g)(1)–(2). 
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standard.56 Additionally, “[t]he Act eliminates the requirement imposed 
by other states that the trust be engaged in the conduct of a trade or 
business or issue certificates or shares.”57 
The DSTA also eliminated several disadvantageous common law 
principles. For example,   DSTA provides for limited liability of trustees 
and beneficial owners.58 The DSTA also grants the settlor and trustee 
greater freedom in their relationships with investors.59 This freedom is 
illustrated by the fact that the critical rights of the trustee and beneficial 
owners—who are also the settlors in the business trusts world60—are set 
in a permissive context, in that the DSTA specifically states:  “[e]xcept to 
the extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of the business 
trust.”61 Such leeway demonstrates the foundational flexibility and 
freedom of contract that are associated with business trusts as an 
organizational form.62 And that flexibility is likely the greatest advantage 
that business trusts offer over other forms of association.63 
II.   A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF TWO BUSINESS TRUST SYSTEMS  
In the United States, business trusts are largely ignored as profitable 
operating entities, and their use is mostly restricted to specific 
industries.64 In certain foreign markets like Singapore, however, this is 
not the case. 
Singapore has one of the best economies in the world, 65 and it is known 
 
 56. Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 43.  
 57. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 54. Traditionally, to be recognized as a business trust, a trust must 
engage in business while also issuing transferrable shares. Speier, supra note 52, at 1075. 
 58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(a); see also id. § 3817 (providing for trustee indemnification). 
The liability of the trustee and beneficial owners is allocated through contract. Id. § 3803. 
 59. See Tritt & Teschner, supra note 2, at 43. 
 60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., tit. 12, § 3805(e). 
 62. See, e.g., id.§ 3806(c) (allowing for the expansion, restriction, and elimination of fiduciary 
duties save the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). There is debate as to whether this 
provision allows the elimination of the basic duties of care and loyalty. Compare Peter B. Oh, Business 
Trusts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 268, 269–70 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (explaining the 
“opt-out” regime the DSTA provides regarding duties of care and loyalty), with Frankel, supra note 37, 
at 332 (“Eliminating all vestiges of fiduciary duties is an unlikely interpretation of an act establishing a 
business trust.”).  
 63. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 54; see also Noble Brandon Judah, Possible Partnership Liability 
Under the Business Trust, 56 AM. L. REV. 826, 827 (1922) (finding the flexibility of business trust 
management to be one of the several advantages that business trusts have over ordinary forms of business). 
 64. Sitkoff, supra note 4. Trusts are, however, used by large public and private charities, so the 
idea that trusts can be used successfully as operating entities is not a radical concept. 
 65. Many Americans may not have been aware of this fact until the popular film, Crazy Rich 
Asians, became a box office hit in 2018. This film portrayed just how successful some Singaporeans are. 
CRAZY RICH ASIANS (Warner Bros. 2018). 
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for being innovative and business-friendly. In fact, in 2018, Bloomberg’s 
Innovation Index ranked Singapore’s economy third in the world when 
measured by stability and overall success.66 According to the CIA, 
“Singapore has a highly developed and successful free market economy. 
It enjoys an open and corruption-free environment, stable prices, and a 
per capita GDP higher than that of most developed countries.”67 Amidst 
this booming economy, business trusts are becoming more popular on the 
Singapore Exchange. Recent news articles from Singapore indicate that 
business trusts, along with REITs, make up the majority of IPOs on the 
Singapore Exchange.68  
Unlike in the United States, the business trust is a new concept in 
Singapore. The Singapore Business Trusts Act (BTA) was enacted in 
2004.69 The motivation for the BTA was most likely due to the 
tremendous success of Singapore Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-
REITs).70 Since S-REITs only dealt with real estate assets, other income 
generating assets such as ships and infrastructure projects could not be 
organized as S-REITs. In light of the S-REITs’ success, Singapore’s 
authorities started looking to accommodate businesses that manage non-
real estate assets by amending its laws to facilitate the listing of other 
assets.71 Therefore, the Singapore business trust was the logical extension 
of the success S-REITs.72 In fact, the Singaporean Minister of Finance, 
Tharman Shanmugaratnam, explained that introducing the business trust 
structure in Singapore would create a new asset class for investors, and 
“potentially add depth and sophistication to Singapore’s capital 
markets.”73 
In the earlier years of these trusts, commentators noted “disappointing 
IPO debuts.”74 In recent years, however, business trusts have gained 
 
 66. John McKenna, South Korea and Sweden Are the Most Innovative Countries in the World, 
WORLD ECON. FORUM (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/south-korea-and-
sweden-are-the-most-innovative-countries-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/2DF3-UX3G]. 
 67. East Asia/Southeast Asia: Singapore, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/print_sn.html [https://perma.cc/5UNU-CLVU ]. 
 68. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 69. Business Trusts Act Timeline, SING. STATUTES ONLINE, 
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/BTA2004?Timeline=On [https://perma.cc/B8DU-VTCF]. 
 70. Tang Wu Hang,  The Resurgence of “Uncorporation”: The Business Trust in Singapore, 8 J. 
BUS. L. 683, 685 (2012). 
 71. Tang Wu Hang, An Introduction to Trust Law in Singapore, 40 TRUST LAW STUDY 163, 178 
(2015), http://shintakuhogakkai.jp/journal/pdf/vol40_en_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7LR-G9QN]. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Minister for Educ. and Deputy Chairman, Monetary Auth. of 
Sing., The Securities and Futures (Amendment) Bill 2004 Second Reading Speech (Sep. 1, 2004), 
https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2004/the-securities-and-futures-amendment-bill-2004 
[https://perma.cc/HWA7-FLYL]. 
 74. Norman Pho, A Tale of Two Cities: Business Trust Listings and Capital Markets in Singapore 
and Hong Kong, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 311, 331 (2012); accord Kevin Brown, Hutchinson Ports 
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popularity in Singapore. In fact, they now dominate the IPOs on the 
Singapore Exchange, along with REITs.75  
Despite having a similar choice between the corporate form76 and the 
business trust form, Singaporean entrepreneurs are increasingly choosing 
the business trust.77 This preference of business trusts in Singapore 
necessitates a closer look at Singapore’s business trust laws as compared 
to those in the United States. Though, it should be noted that the success 
of the business trust in Singapore does not guarantee its success in the 
United States. When used in a new business environment with distinct 
laws and practices, a construct that was successful in its original context 
may adapt to the new environment in unforeseen and unintended ways.78 
Nevertheless, the legal and economic climates of Singapore and the 
United States seem similar enough to allow for a successful transplant of 
the Singapore business trust into the United States. 
Accordingly, this section will explore and compare the structure and 
requirements of business trusts in the United States and Singapore. To 
make this comparison, this Article will focus on the U.S. Uniform 
Statutory Trust Entity Act (USTEA) rather than a state-specific statute.79 
A.   Formation 
Formation refers to the formal procedures required to create a business 
trust and to trigger recognition by the sovereignty under which it is 
organized. 
1. Formation of U.S. Business Trusts 
To form a business trust, one must file a certificate of trust with the 
state.80 At minimum, the certificate of trust must include the trust’s name, 
 
Disappoints on IPO Debut, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/44e6bc0e-5159-
11e0-a9c6-00144feab49a (discussing the disappointing IPO debut of one listed Singapore business trust 
in 2011). 
 75. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 76. The Singapore corporate entity differs from that of the United States, but in both countries, the 
corporate and business trust forms operate within a code-based, common-law system ; the issue of entity 
choice in Singapore is thus roughly approximate to the issue of entity choice in the United States. 
 77. See infra Section II.B.2; see also Alchian, supra note 9, at 211–21. 
 78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 79. The USTEA was written by the Uniform Law Commission in 2009 to “modernize[] the 
existing, but outdated, laws governing [business trusts].” Statutory Trust Entity Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
https://my.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=8277f058-520e-40f2-8413-
bf1c7bc4836d (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).  Although it has only been enacted by Kentucky and the District 
of Columbia, it nevertheless serves as a good model for comparison purposes. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009). 
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its address, its agent’s address, and, “if the trust may have one or more 
series, a statement to that effect.”81 Beyond those requirements, the 
certificate of trust may contain any other terms.82 The business trust is 
formed at the moment of filing, unless the certificate specifies a different 
date.83 
2.   Formation of Singapore Business Trusts 
Singapore business trusts are created through a trust deed.84 This deed 
also “provides for the governance of the affairs of the trust and the 
conduct of its business.”85 If the business trust is registered, meaning it is 
listed on the Singapore Exchange, this deed is required to have certain 
provisions. These provisions relate to the powers of the trustee, the scope 
and structure of the business, the duration (or lack thereof) of the trust, 
“the conditions governing the transfer of units in the registered business 
trust,” the trustee’s compensation, the fees payable from the trust 
property, and any “other matters as may be prescribed by the Authority.”86 
To register a business trust in Singapore, the “proposed trustee-
manager” must first apply for registration with the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore.87 This allows the trust to be publicly traded. Registration is not 
guaranteed, as “[t]the Authority may refuse an application to register a 
business” for several reasons,88 including if “the Authority is not satisfied 
that the application lodged has complied with section 3.” The Authority 
may also refuse the application if it “is not satisfied that the proposed 
trustee-manager of the business trust is a company and not an exempt 
private company.” In addition, the Authority may refuse the application 
if the proposed trustee-manager or any substantial shareholder or officer 
has been convicted “of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty or . . . 
has been convicted of an offence under [the Business Trusts] Act.”89 In 
certain cases, the proposed trustee-manager is given an opportunity to be 
heard before the application is refused.90 However, in some 
circumstances, the Authority will deny the application without giving the 
 
 81. Id. § 201(b). 
 82. Id. § 201(c). 
 83. Id. §§ 201(d), 204(c). 
 84. See BUS. TRS. ACT ch. 31A, § 1 (Sing. 2005), 
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/BTA2004?Timeline=On. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. § 28(1). 
 87. Id.  §§ 2, 3(1). 
 88. Id. § 4(2). 
 89. Id. § 4(2)(a), (b), (i). 
 90. Id. § 4(3). For example, if the proposed business manager did not conform with the application 
requirements, it would be given an opportunity to be heard. Id.  
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proposed trustee-manager such an opportunity.91 For example, if the 
proposed trustee-manager has been convicted of an offense involving 
fraud or dishonesty, the application will be denied without an opportunity 
to be heard.92  
B.   Management 
Once the business trust is formed, it must be managed in a way that 
generates profit lest the trust become insolvent. While Singapore and U.S. 
business trusts are substantially similar, their most marked differences 
manifest in the context of trust management. Management refers to the 
formal requirements of who may manage a business trust, the duties a 
manager owes to unitholders, and liability for a manager’s breach of such 
duties.  
1. Management of U.S. Business Trusts 
U.S. business trusts may be structured to give ultimate control over the 
trust to the beneficial owners or to the trustees. “The governing instrument 
may authorize any person, including a beneficial owner, to direct a trustee 
or other person in the management of a statutory trust.”93 This means that 
the drafter of a business trust instrument may choose who will manage 
the trust.94  
Under the USTEA, the only restrictions on who may be the trustee of 
a U.S. business trust are those imposed by the governing instrument or 
state law.95 As the manager of the trust, “a trustee shall act in good faith 
and in a manner the trustee reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the statutory trust.”96 Additionally, “[a] trustee shall discharge its duties 
with the care that a person in a similar position would reasonably believe 
 
 91. Id. § 4(4). 
 92. Id. § 4(4)(c). 
 93. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).. § 510(a). 
 94. If the trust is drafted to give the beneficial owners this control, this would give a broad set of 
powers to the owners of the trust. Additionally, the owners may change authority figures and the overall 
strategy of the trust, because the governing instrument may be adapted to fit any changes that arise. See 
id. § 103(d) (allowing the governing instrument to be amended with the approval of all beneficial owners). 
 95. Id. § 501, cmt. (“Section 102(19) defines the term “trustee” as a person designated, appointed, 
or elected as such in accordance with the governing instrument or applicable law. Section 103(e)(6)(C) 
confirms that the governing instrument may provide for trustee appointment. However, because this act 
does not provide for trustee appointment, if the governing instrument does not provide for trustee 
appointment, then under Section 105 the state’s law pertaining to trustee appointment in common-law 
trusts controls.”). 
 96. Id. § 505(a)–(b). (“(a) Subject to Section 403, in exercising the powers of trusteeship, a trustee 
shall act in good faith and in a manner the trustee reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
statutory trust. (b) A trustee shall discharge its duties with the care that a person in a similar position would 
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”). 
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appropriate under the circumstances.”97  
The U.S. business trust is a separate legal entity by statute.98 The 
beneficial owners and trustees of a business trust enjoy limited liability 
protection and do not have any financial obligations in the case of 
insolvency. “A beneficial owner, trustee, agent of the trust, or agent of the 
trustee is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of 
contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the 
trust.”99  
2.   Management of Singapore Business Trusts 
Singapore has strict management requirements for business trusts. The 
trustee must be a company that does not “carry on any other business.”100 
Additionally, the trustee-manager cannot be an “exempt private 
company,”101 which is defined as:  
a private company . . . the shares of which no beneficial interest is held 
directly or indirectly by any corporation and which has not more than 20 
members; or any private company . . . that is wholly owned by the 
Government, which . . . [is] declare[d] . . . to be an exempt private 
company.102 
If any person fails to adhere to these requirements, that person “shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding $100,000.”103  
Prior to the early 2000s, Singapore business trusts and REITs were not 
treated as separate entities.104 Unitholders of a business trust do not own 
the underlying assets of the business trust, but rather “share in the 
 
 97. Id. § 505(b). The USTEA models itself after corporate fiduciary duties, not trust fiduciary 
duties. Id. § 505 cmt. This is different from Delaware’s business trust statute, which specifically 
incorporates trust law into its statutory trust act and allows the governing instrument to expand or eliminate 
fiduciary duties. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3806(c), 3810 (2018). 
 98. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(g) (West 2018). 
 99. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 304(a) (“A debt, obligation, or other liability of a 
statutory trust or series thereof is solely a debt, obligation, or other liability of the trust or series thereof. 
A beneficial owner, trustee, agent of the trust, or agent of the trustee is not personally liable, directly or 
indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the trust or series 
thereof solely by reason of being or acting as a trustee, beneficial owner, agent of the trust, or agent of the 
trustee.”). 
 100. Id. at Part III, div. 1. 
 101. Id. § 6(1). 
 102. Id. § 2; COMPANIES ACT ch. 50, § 4(1) (Sing. 2006). 
 103. BUS. TRS. ACT § 6(4). 
 104. Hans Tjio, Merrill and Smith’s Intermediate Rights Lying Between Contract and Property: 
Are Singapore Trusts and Secured Transactions Drifting Away from English Law Towards American 
Law?, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 244–45 (2019). 
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beneficial ownership in the trust property of the business trust.”105 Rather, 
Singapore courts view the beneficial interest under a trust as a right 
against a trustee rather than a proprietary right:106 “[U]nit holders are 
expressly stated not to have any equitable proprietary interest in the trust 
property but only a right to compel due performance by the trustee.”107 In 
Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v. Compañia De Navegación 
Palomar, SA, the Singapore Court of Appeal recognized that a beneficial 
interest is “a right against a right,” or “a right to constrain or control the 
way another person exercises his right to deal with a thing, rather than a 
right against the thing itself.”108 Such a recognition has allowed Singapore 
courts to recognize business trusts and REITs as separate legal 
entities109—an important development that allows unsecured creditors to 
look directly to the business trust, rather than through the trustee’s right 
of indemnity, to enforce their rights.110  
In general, the trustee’s powers come from the BTA and the trust deed. 
The trustee is directed to “manage and operate the registered business 
trust in accordance with the provisions of [the BTA] and the trust deed of 
the registered business[] and . . . perform the functions conferred on it by 
the trust deed and the provisions of [the BTA].”111 If authorized by the 
trust deed, the trustee may delegate its management authority.112 
The BTA also outlines the duties of the trustee-manager. “The trustee-
manager . . . shall at all times act honestly and exercise reasonable 
diligence in the discharge of its duties as a trustee-manager in accordance 
with [the BTA] and the trust deed . . ..”113 The trustee must “act in the best 
interests of all the unitholders of the registered business trust as a 
whole.”114 In the event of a conflict of interest between the trustee and the 
unitholders, the trustee must always put the unitholders’ interests first.115 
Additionally, the trustee must not use information acquired as trustee for 
its or any other person’s gain to the detriment of the unitholders.116 
Finally, the trustee must hold the trust property in “trust for all the 
unitholders . . . in accordance with the terms of the trust deed.”117 If the 
 
 105. BUS. TRS. ACT § 1. 
 106. Tjio, supra note 104, at 239. 
 107. Id. at 245. 
 108. Id. at 239. 
 109. Id. at 244. 
 110. Id. at 242. 
 111. BUS. TRS. ACT. § 8(1). Breaching this section comes with a fine of up to $100,000. Id. § 8(5). 
 112. Id. § 8(2). 
 113. Id. § 10(1). 
 114. Id. § 10(2)(a). 
 115. Id. § 10(2)(b). 
 116. Id. § 10(3). 
 117. Id. § 10(4). 
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trustee contravenes any of these duties, it  
shall be liable to all the unitholders . . . as a whole for any profit or financial 
gain directly or indirectly made by it or any of its related corporations or 
for any damage suffered by all the unitholders . . . as a whole as a result of 
the contravention.118 
Any provision in a trust deed that indemnifies the trustee against 
“liability for breach of trust where the trustee-manager fails to exercise 
the degree of care and diligence required of a trustee-manager of a 
registered business trust” is void.119 Further, unitholders may take legal 
action against the trustee-manager in his or her individual capacity, which 
increases the liability of a trustee-manager to include personal liability for 
contravention of his or her duties.120  
Unitholders who have invested in a Singapore business trust are not 
personally liable for any of the trust’s debts, liabilities, or obligations; 
liability of a unitholder is limited to amounts that were expressly 
contributed to the registered trust.121 In this regard, the benefit of using 
the business trust is that unitholders waive their right to obtain possession 
of trust property.122 This means that business trusts can limit their 
exposure in certain situations by obtaining more tangible assets. 
Despite being subject to strict qualifications and liabilities, trustees in 
a Singapore business trust enjoy significant protection from removal. 
Section 20 of the BTA requires at least 75% of unitholders to agree to 
remove a trustee.123 Because it is difficult for 75% of unitholders to reach 
agreement, trustees are heavily protected from removal by unitholders.124 
Accordingly, once a trustee meets the above qualifications,125 the trustee 
need only avoid breaching fiduciary duties to the unitholders to remain in 
 
 118. Id. § 10(5)(a). Additionally, the trustee will be guilty of a criminal offense with a penalty of 
up to $100,000. Id. § 10(5)(b). 
 119. Id. § 29(1). 
 120. Id. § 40 (“Any unitholder of a registered business trust who suffers loss or damage because of 
any conduct of the trustee-manager of the registered business trust which contravenes any provision of 
this Act may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against the trustee-manager, whether or 
not the trustee-manager has been convicted of an offence in respect of such contravention.”). 
 121. Id. § 32 (“For the avoidance of doubt, a unitholder of a registered business trust shall not be 
liable to contribute to the registered business trust or in respect of any debts, liabilities or obligations 
incurred by the trustee-manager in its capacity as trustee-manager for the registered business trust, other 
than such outstanding amounts of money, if any, which the unitholder has expressly agreed to contribute 
to the registered business trust.”). 
 122. Id. § 34 (“No creditor of a unitholder of a registered business trust shall have any right to obtain 
possession of, or otherwise exercise any legal or equitable remedy with respect to, the trust property of 
the registered business trust.”). 
 123. Id. § 20(a). 
 124. Tang, supra note 70, at 692. 
 125. See supra notes 111–124 and accompanying text. 
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control of the business trust.126 
This near-immunity granted to trustees is an attractive feature of the 
BTA for trust sponsors.127 Most trust sponsors own the trustee-manager 
company, or at least own a majority stake in it.128 Thus, the sponsor often 
has an interest in keeping the original trustee in place.129 The sponsor can 
protect that interest well because the sponsor needs only 25% of the units 
“plus one” to retain the original trustee.130 Further, because the sponsor is 
usually a unitholder,131 the sponsor also votes on whether to remove the 
trustee. Essentially, because the sponsor is playing defense in trying to 
keep the trustee, the sponsor has a much lower burden in ensuring the 
continuity of the trustee of its choice.132  
The advantage that sponsors have in retaining their trustees has been a 
major factor in certain companies deciding to list as a Singapore business 
trust.133 In fact, the difficulty in removing the trustee without the 
sponsor’s cooperation was part of the driving force in the BTA. Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam134 stated that the 75% removal requirement was the 
correct threshold for preventing frivolous removal of trustees, while still 
 
 126. See Tang, supra note 70, at 696 (identifying and analyzing the fiduciary duties required of 
Singapore business trustees). 
 127. Id. at 692. 
 128. Id. 
 129. This interest is two-fold: first, the sponsor, by owning the trustee-manager company, has 
significant control over how the trust is operated. Second, and equally as important, the sponsor has a 
financial interest, in that the trustee-manager company is paid for its performance as trustee. Thus, as 
shareholder in the trustee-management company, the sponsor derives financial gain from the company 
continuing to receive performance fees. See Tang, supra note 70, at 697–98 (addressing performance fee 
calculation and certain concerns with performance fees generally). 
 130. Id. at 692. 
 131. CLIFFORD CHANCE, WHY SINGAPORE BUSINESS TRUSTS ARE PROVING POPULAR WITH INDIAN 
SPONSORS 2 (2012), https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2012/09/ 
why-singapore-business-trusts-are-proving-popular-with-indian-sponsors.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K7E-
FG2U]. 
 132. The ability of sponsors to retain the original trustee-manager company is not looked upon 
fondly by all commentators. For example, David Webb, a well-known Hong Kong corporate governance 
activist, argues that sponsors have too much control at the expense of unitholders. Tang, supra note 70, at 
696. In discussing Hutchison Whampoa Ltd.’s decision to list in Singapore as a business trust, Webb 
remarked: 
All in all, we can see no good reason for [Hong Kong] to emulate Singapore Business Trusts. 
There's no tax reason for doing so, and there are governance reasons why we shouldn't. We should 
not race to the bottom just to win business from tycoons who are not willing to work with existing 
corporate governance standards, nor should we offer tax incentives for trustee-managers (or any 
other business sector). 
David M. Webb, HPH Trust is No Loss to HK, WEBB-SITE REPORTS (Jan. 21, 2011), https://webb-
site.com/articles/hutchport.asp [https://perma.cc/M8KY-5KGH]. 
 133. See, e.g., Tang, supra note 70, at 697 (discussing the 75% requirement to be an effective 
prevention against hostile takeover of the trustee-manager company). 
 134. Tharman. Shanmugaratnam was Singapore’s Minister of Finance from 2007-2015. Finance 
Minister Bios, MINISTRY OF FIN. SING., https://www.mof.gov.sg/About-Us/finance-minister-bios (last 
visited May 16, 2019). 
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providing sufficient rights to unitholders to remove inefficient trustees.135 
This frivolous removal threatens the continuity of the business trust as an 
effective organization.136 Accordingly, the 75% requirement is focused 
on the efficiency of the trust, not as an entrenchment device.137 
C. Taxation 
One of the most important factors to consider when selecting an 
organizational form concerns the tax consequences associated with the 
potential business structures. 
1. Taxation of U.S. Business Trusts138 
The taxation of a U.S. business trust depends on its purpose. If a trust 
“is created to protect or conserve trust property on behalf of trust 
beneficiaries”—like an ordinary donative trust—it will be taxed as a trust 
under Subchapter J.139 If a trust is “a device to carry on a profit-making 
business,” as a true business trust would be, it is subject to the check-the-
box tax regulations.140 The check-the-box regulations allow a business 
trust to elect to be taxed as a partnership under Subchapter K or as a 
corporation under Subchapter C.141 If a business trust elects partnership 
treatment, it will be treated as a pass-through entity and generally only 
taxed at the beneficiary level.142 If a trust elects to be treated as a 
corporation, however, it may be taxed at both the trust level and the 
beneficiary level.143 If a business trust is publicly traded, it generally must 
be taxed as a corporation.144 
 
 135. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Minister for Educ. And Deputy Chairman, Monetary Auth. of 
Sing., The Securities and Futures (Amendment) Bill 2004 Second Reading Speech (Sep. 1, 2004), 
https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2004/second-reading-the-business-trusts-bill 
[https://perma.cc/HWA7-FLYL ].  
 136. Tang, supra note 70, at 697. 
 137. See id. Professor Tang recognizes this focus as a possibility, but also recommends that 
Singapore’s policy makers reconsider the 75% requirement. Id. 
 138. For a thorough discussion of taxation of U.S. business trusts, see Tritt & Teschner, supra note 
2, at 44–47. 
 139. Carter G. Bishop, Forgotten Trust: A Check-the-Box Achilles’ Heel, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
529, 554 (2010). 
 140. Id. at 554–55. 
 141. Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1331 
(2013). 
 142. GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 29 (3d ed. 2016). 
 143. Id. at 17. 
 144. Id. at 15. 
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2.   Taxation of Singapore Business Trusts 
A Singapore business trust is generally taxed like a Singapore 
corporation,145 meaning that it is subject to the same tax rates, tax relief, 
and foreign tax credits as Singapore corporations.146 Singapore business 
trusts are only taxed at the trustee level,147 and unitholders are not taxed 
on distributions made by the trust.148 
D.   Transferability 
Transferability refers to the ability of unitholders to dispose of their 
interest, or units, in a business trust. Like U.S. corporations, both U.S. and 
Singapore business trusts—as a general rule—allow free transferability 
of ownership in the company. The primary restriction on that 
transferability is what the trust’s governing instrument provides. 
1. Transferability of U.S Business Trusts  
Another benefit of the business trust is transferability. “A beneficial 
interest in a statutory trust is freely transferable,” and “[a] beneficial 
interest in a statutory trust is personal property regardless of the nature of 
the property of the trust.”149 This freely transferable interest allows for 
more flexible terms when fundraising for business trusts. While public 
trading is a great option, more creative ways to partner, trade, invest, or 
sell are available to business trusts, including contribution by owner.150  
Similarly, merger is available and not as heavily regulated for business 
trusts as it is within the public markets.151 Ultimately, merger or winding 
up—while not an end goal for many businesses—tends to be easier for 
business trusts. Only those who have an interest in the business trust may 
 
 145. INLAND REVENUE AUTH. OF SING., IRAS E-TAX GUIDE: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF A 
TRUST REGISTERED UNDER THE BUSINESS TRUSTS ACT § 4.1  (2d ed. 2019). 
 146. Id. § 4.2. 
 147. Id. § 4.5. 
 148. Id. 
 149. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 601.  
 150. Id. § 603. Contribution by the owner is not necessarily an option for a publicly traded company 
due to the structuring of certain publicly-traded ownership agreements. For example, the Code of Federal 
Regulations requires that purchasers of securities be an accredited investor. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2018). 
 151. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 706(a) (“A statutory trust may merge with one or more 
other constituent organizations pursuant to this section and Sections 707 through 709 and a plan of merger 
if: (1) the merger is not prohibited by the governing law of any constituent organization; and (2) each of 
the other organizations complies with its governing law in effecting the merger.”). By contrast, because 
public companies fall under the Code of Federal Regulations, numerous activities must be undergone 
before merger or acquisition, including market value validation, identification of shares outstanding, 
disclosure of prior IPO’s, securities disclosure, and more. 17 C.F.R. §229.1000. 
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receive discharge of debt, a distribution of surplus property, and other 
beneficial interests.152 
2.   Transferability of Singapore Business Trusts 
The trust deed governs the conditions for transferring units in a 
registered business trust.153 The trust deed may permit the free transfer of 
trust units, or it may place more restrictions on transfer. This allows for 
flexibility in how a Singapore business trust wishes to operate. 
When a Singapore business trust chooses to cease operations, there are 
three ways in which a registered business trust may be wound up. First, it 
may be wound up under a provision of the trust deed.154 Second, it may 
be wound up at the direction of the unitholders.155 Finally, it may be 
wound up by court order.156 Winding up is subject to certain notice 
requirements, and a court ordered wind up may impose more 
requirements.157 
The recent affirmation of the Singapore business trust as a separate 
legal entity has made it so that the business trust may be liquidated as 
an entity.158 This has positive implications for the developing 
insolvency and restructuring laws in Singapore.159 
E. Other Requirements 
Other requirements with which U.S. business trusts and Singapore 
business trusts must comply include voting requirements and 
requirements for distributions to unitholders, among others. These 
remaining requirements in the USTEA and BTA demonstrate the final 
nuanced differences between U.S. and Singapore business trusts. 
 
 152. UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 803(a)–(b) (“(a) A dissolved statutory trust shall wind 
up its activities, and the trust and each series thereof continues after dissolution only for the purpose of its 
winding up. (b) In winding up its activities, a statutory trust shall: (1) discharge the trust’s debts, 
obligations, and other liabilities, settle and close the trust’s activities, and marshal and distribute the 
property of the trust; and (2) distribute any surplus property after complying with paragraph (1) to the 
beneficial owners in proportion to their beneficial interests.”). 
 153. BUS. TRS. ACT § 28(1)(d). 
 154. Id. § 44(3)(a). 
 155. Id. § 45(1). 
 156. Id. § 46(1)-(3). 
 157. Id. §§ 47(2)-(3), 48(2), 48(5). 
 158. Tjio, supra note 104, at 245. 
 159. Id. at 262. 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss3/5
2020] BUSINESS TRUSTS IN NEO-INNOVATIVE ECONOMIES 755 
1.   Other Requirements of U.S. Business Trusts 
As a testament to the flexibility of business trust, the USTEA imposes 
few additional requirements beyond what has already been discussed. For 
example, the USTEA provides that trustees may act only through a 
majority of the trustees.160 If, however, the majority of trustees indicate 
they would vote in consent to an action, the trustees may act without a 
meeting, without previous notice, and without actually taking a vote.161 
The rules governing unitholder voting are the same.162 
The limitations on distribution from a business trust are similar to those 
in corporate law. A trust may not make distributions if doing so would 
result in insolvency.163 The determination of whether a distribution is 
appropriate is left to the trustee.164 A trustee may base the appropriateness 
of a distribution on “a fair valuation [of the trust] or other method that is 
reasonable under the circumstances.”165 This standard by which the 
trustee makes this determination illustrates the flexibility of the 
distribution process 
The USTEA also models corporate law in trust litigation. Because a 
U.S. business trust is a separate legal entity, the trust may sue and be sued 
under its own name.166 In the context of unitholders suing the trust, the 
suit may come in either direct or derivative form.167 Like corporate law, 
if a business trust is named as a party in a derivative suit, the trust may 
appoint a special litigation committee to determine whether pursuing the 
action is in the best interests of the trust.168 Moreover, the special 
committee may be composed of trustees, provided they are independent 
and disinterested in the derivative suit.169 These trustees hire outside 
counsel and investigate the merits of the suit and its impact on the trust as 
a whole.170 
 
 160. BUS. TRS. ACT § 503(1).  
 161. Id. § 503(2). If the trustees act in this way, they must provide notice to the trustees that were 
absent or that would not have consented had the action been voted on. Id. 
 162. Id. § 603(1)–(2). 
 163. See id. § 615(a)(1)–(2). 
 164. Id. § 615(b). 
 165. Id. § 615(b)(2). Despite this fluid standard in determining distributions, an improper 
distribution can result in the trustee being personally liable for the amount of distribution deemed 
improper. Id. § 616(a). However, as section 616(a) mentions, a distribution is improper only if the trustee 
acts outside the prescriptions of section 505. Id. Because section 505 gives latitude to trustees—requiring 
they act in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of the trust—a plaintiff would be hard-
pressed to show an improper distribution absent some egregious trustee conduct. See id. § 505(a)–(b). 
 166. Id. § 308. 
 167. Id. §§ 609, 610. 
 168. Id. § 613(a). 
 169. Id. § 613(b). 
 170. Marc I. Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder 
Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1980). Understandably, many scholars critique the use of 
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2.   Other Requirements of Singapore Business Trusts 
The BTA imposes requirements on registered business trusts that are 
similar to some of the securities regulations in the United States. 
Interestingly, some of the requirements imposed on business trusts are 
actually higher than those for other entities listed on the Singapore 
Exchange.171 Yet, for the many business trusts on the Singapore 
Exchange, this seems to be palpable tradeoff for the benefits that come 
with the business trust form. 
For example, under the Business Trust Regulations, registered business 
trusts must have an audit committee that meets the requirements imposed 
by the Singapore Monetary Authority.172 The Business Trusts Regulations 
provide that the audit committee must be comprised of three or more 
members who are all “independent of management and business 
relationships with the trustee-manager.”173 Additionally, a majority of 
audit committee members must be “independent from every substantial 
shareholder of the trustee-manager” as well as independent of business 
relationships with the trustee-manager.174 The audit committee is 
responsible for reviewing the audit plan of the trust, the appointed 
auditor’s evaluation of the trustee’s accounting controls, and the auditor’s 
report, among other things.175  
There are also disclosure requirements on registered business trusts, 
such as disclosures of all interests the directors of the trustee-manager 
company have in the trust and trust transactions.176  
In addition, the BTA specifically provides that when a conflict of 
interests arises, the directors of the trustee-manager company are to 
“prefer the interest of the unit holders as a whole.”177 
Many other formalities, such as proxy voting,178 disclosure of 
 
special litigation committees, finding that the committee will always determine that litigation is contrary 
to the company’s best interests. See, e.g., id. (“After calling witnesses, examining documentary evidence, 
and issuing a detailed report, the committee, with the concurrence of the special counsel, concludes that 
the suit is contrary to the corporation’s best interests because of the litigation’s improbability of success, 
its high costs, the disruption to the company’s business, and the adverse impact on employee morale.”). 
But see Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical 
Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1309 (2009) (using SEC filings to find that special litigation committees 
pursue litigation more frequently than previously recognized). 
 171. Pho, supra note 74, at 317. 
 172. BUS. TRS. ACT § 15(1). 
 173. BUS. TRS. REGULATIONS, Chap. 31A, Reg. 2, § 13(1)(b)(i) (Sing. 2006). 
 174. Id. § 13(1)(b)(ii). 
 175. Id. § 13(6). 
 176. BUS. TRS. ACT §§ 13–14. 
 177. Tang, supra note 70, at 691. 
 178. BUS. TRS. ACT § 60 (“(1) A unitholder of a registered business trust entitled to attend and vote 
at a meeting of the unitholders of the registered business trust, or at a meeting of any class of unitholders 
of the registered business trust, shall be entitled to appoint another person or persons, whether a unitholder 
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interests,179 appointment of powers,180 and distributions to unitholders181 
are outlined in the registration process. Additionally, Singapore business 
trusts are required to hold an Annual General Meeting.182 During this 
meeting, most business decisions are made through a voting system.183 
Examples of these decisions include passing resolutions,184 annual 
 
or not, as his proxy to attend and vote instead of the unitholder at the meeting. (2) A proxy appointed 
under subsection (1) to attend and vote at a meeting of the unitholders of a registered business trust instead 
of a unitholder of the registered business trust shall also have the same right as the unitholder to speak at 
the meeting, but unless the trust deed otherwise provides — (a) a proxy shall not be entitled to vote except 
on a poll; (b) a unitholder shall not be entitled to appoint more than 2 proxies to attend and vote at the 
same meeting; and (c) where a unitholder appoints 2 proxies, the appointments shall be invalid unless he 
specifies the proportions of his holdings to be represented by each proxy.”). 
 179. Id. § 12(1) (“Subject to subsections (2) and (3), every director of the trustee-manager of a 
registered business trust who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a transaction or 
proposed transaction entered or to be entered into by the trustee-manager for or on behalf of the registered 
business trust shall, as soon as practicable 2005 Ed. Business Trusts CAP. 31A 20 Informal Consolidation 
– version in force from 1/7/2015 after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge, declare the nature 
of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the trustee-manager.”). 
 180. Id. § 97 (“(1) The Authority may appoint any person to exercise any of its powers or perform 
any of its functions or duties under this Act, either generally or in any particular case, except the power to 
make subsidiary legislation. (2) Any person appointed by the Authority under subsection (1) shall be 
deemed to be a public servant for the purposes of the Penal Code (Cap. 224).”). 
 181. Id. § 33(1) (“The trustee-manager of a registered business trust shall have the right to declare 
a distribution of profits, income or other payments or returns to the unitholders of the registered business 
trust out of the trust property of the registered business trust; but such distribution shall only be made if 
the board of directors of the trustee-manager makes a written statement, in accordance with a resolution 
of the board of directors of the trustee-manager and signed by not less than 2 of the directors, that the 
board of directors is satisfied on reasonable grounds that, immediately after making the distribution, the 
trustee-manager will be able to fulfil, from the trust property of the registered business trust, the liabilities 
of the registered business trust as these liabilities fall due.”). 
 182. Id. § 53(1) (“The trustee-manager of a registered business trust shall call a general meeting of 
the unitholders of the registered business trust known as the “annual general meeting” once in every 
calendar year and not more than 15 months after the holding of the last preceding annual general meeting, 
but so long as the unitholders of the registered business trust hold their first annual general meeting within 
18 months of the registration of the registered business trust, the trustee-manager need not call an annual 
general meeting in the year of the registration of the registered business trust or in the following year.”). 
 183. Id. § 57(1) (“So far as the trust deed of a registered business trust does not make any other 
provision in that behalf and subject to section 58 — (a) 2 unitholders of the registered business trust 
personally present shall form a quorum; (b) any unitholder of the registered business trust elected by the 
unitholders present at a meeting may be chairman thereof; (c) on a show of hands, each unitholder of the 
registered business trust who is personally present and entitled to vote shall have one vote; and (d) on a 
poll, each unitholder of the registered business trust shall have one vote in respect of each unit in the 
registered business trust held by him.”). 
 184. Id. § 66 (“Where a resolution is passed at an adjourned meeting of the unitholders of a 
registered business trust or of unitholders of any class of units in the registered business trust, the 
resolution shall for all purposes be treated as having been passed on the date on which it was in fact passed 
and not on any earlier date.”). 
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returns,185 and financial statements.186 The enforcement branch is made 
up of compliance,187 inspectors,188 injunctions,189 and penalties.190  
F. Primary Benefits and Differences  
In reviewing both the USTEA and the BTA, four major differences are 
evident between the two systems: control, structure and enforcement, 
sustainability, and taxation.  
1.   Control 
The sponsoring entity of a Singapore business trust can easily retain 
control of the business trust. Section 20 of the BTA prescribes an onerous 
75% threshold before a trustee-manger may be changed.191 This provision 
makes it difficult for unitholders to remove the trustee-manager, as a 
three-fourths majority at a meeting is extremely difficult to achieve. Since 
the sponsoring entity is likely to control the trustee-manager company by 
way of majority shareholding, a sponsoring entity may prevent even the 
possibility of removal of the trustee-manager by retaining more than 25% 
 
 185. Id. § 74(1) (“The trustee-manager of a registered business trust shall lodge with the Authority, 
within one month after the annual general meeting of the unitholders of the registered business trust, a 
return containing such statements and particulars as may be prescribed by the Authority.”). 
 186. Id. § 79(1) (“Notwithstanding section 78 and anything in the trust deed of a registered business 
trust the units of which are listed on the approved [securities] exchange, the trustee-manager of the 
registered business trust may, in such cases as may be prescribed by the Authority and provided all the 
conditions imposed thereunder by the Authority are complied with, send a summary financial statement 
of the registered business trust complying with the requirements of subsections (4) and (5) instead of 
copies of the documents referred to in section 78(1) to the unitholders of the listed registered business 
trust.”). 
 187. Id. § 102(1) (“If any person in contravention of this Act refuses or fails to permit the inspection 
of any register, minute book or document or to supply a copy of any register, minute book or document, 
the court may by order compel an immediate inspection of the register, minute book or document or order 
the copy to be supplied.”). 
 188. Id. § 103(1)(a) (“Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Minister may appoint any person 
as an inspector to investigate any matter if he is satisfied that — (a) a prima facie case has been established 
that, for the protection of the public, the unitholders or the creditors of a registered business trust, it is 
desirable that the affairs of the registered business trust should be investigated . . . .”). 
 189. Id. § 104(1) (“Where a person has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in any conduct 
that constitutes or would constitute a contravention of this Act or the trust deed of a registered business 
trust, the court may, on the application of” — 127 CAP. 31A Business Trusts 2005 Ed. Informal 
Consolidation – version in force from 1/7/2015 “(a) the Authority; or (b) any person whose interests have 
been, are or would be affected by the conduct, grant an injunction restraining the first-mentioned person 
from engaging in the conduct and, if the court is of the opinion that it is desirable to do so, requiring that 
person to do any act or thing.”). 
 190. Id. § 110. “Any person guilty of an offence under this Act for which no penalty is expressly 
provided shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $50,000.”). 
 191. See BUS. TRS. ACT § 20 (requiring a 75% supermajority of unitholders to agree before a trustee 
can be removed). 
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of the units. This requirement gives unit holders very little say in 
management.192 In contrast, the unitholders in a U.S. business trust may 
have broad power in the control and management of the trust.193 
2.   Structure and Enforcement 
There are also differences in how Singapore and U.S. business trusts 
are structured and enforced. This may shed light on why business trusts 
are more readily used in Singapore as compared to the United States.  
The management of U.S. business trusts is more flexible than the 
management of Singapore business trusts. In Singapore, only a company 
that does not carry on any other business and is not an “exempt private 
company” can act as the trustee manager of a Singapore business trust.194 
This requirement is much more restrictive than the requirements in the 
United States. Under the USTEA, there are no restrictions on who may 
be the trustee of a U.S. business trust except those imposed by the 
governing instrument or state law.195 In addition, many of the strict 
operational aspects imposed on Singapore trusts are not imposed on U.S. 
business trusts. For example, U.S. business trusts are not required to hold 
annual meetings, have a certain number of independent trustees, or have 
an audit committee.  
While some of Singapore’s BTA is very similar to the USTEA, many 
of its requirements are more stringent. Some of Singapore’s business trust 
requirements are closer to U.S. corporate law requirements than to U.S. 
business trust requirements. This makes sense because Singapore’s 
business trust law seems to structure these trusts so that they may be listed 
on the Singapore Exchange. However, even with some of the BTA’s strict 
requirements, Singapore business trusts retain the flexibility that makes 
them so popular. Meanwhile, in the United States, business trusts do not 
come prepackaged to be listed on the stock exchange in this way. This 
does not preclude U.S. business trusts from being publicly traded, but 
rather provides the flexibility to structure the business trust in a way that 
will allow it to be listed on the stock exchange if so desired196 To do so, 
 
 192. Tang, supra note 70, at 696. 
 193. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 194. BUS. TRS. ACT § 6(1) (“No person other than a company (not being an exempt private 
company) shall act as the trustee-manager of a registered business trust.”). 
 195. See UNIF. STATUTORY TR. ENTITY ACT § 501, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009) (“Section 
102(24) defines the term ‘trustee’ as a person designated, appointed, or elected as such in accordance with 
the governing instrument or applicable law. Section 103(e)(6)(C) confirms that the governing instrument 
may provide for trustee appointment. However, because this act does not provide for trustee appointment, 
if the governing instrument does not provide for trustee appointment, then under Section 105 the state’s 
law pertaining to trustee appointment in common-law trusts controls.”). 
 196. For a contrasting view, see Frankel, supra note 37, at 342–43. 
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the verbiage of a trust’s governing instrument may need to be updated to 
conform more closely to the Corporation Act and the Securities Acts. At 
the same time, the trust instrument must be drafted to specifically outline 
the trust’s differences to corporations. For example: 
The position in the [BTA] is much clearer in this regard. The [BTA] 
contains the equivalent of ss 339(3) and 340 of the Companies Act. 
Therefore, an officer of the trustee-manager is both criminally liable and 
personally liable for any debt that he contracted without any reasonable or 
probable ground for expecting, at the time of contracting, that the debt 
would be paid.197 
Mirroring this well-defined law in the United States, which is the 
paragon of public trade structure, is essential for business trusts that wish 
to trade publicly. This mirroring of terms in the USTEA to terms found 
in the Uniform Corporations Act is similar to the BTA’s equivalency to 
the Singapore Companies Act—which applies to companies incorporated 
in Singapore and outlines everything from incorporation to winding up. 
.But even more important is the ability of business trusts to differentiate 
themselves from corporations while having enough structure to comply 
with securities law. Doing this would allow a business trust to be publicly 
traded without being as constrained as corporations.  
In addition to these more restrictive requirements, Singapore trust 
enforcement is much more punitive than U.S. business trust law. The 
BTA imposes strict requirements on business trusts, and trustees may face 
criminal liability and fines for nonadherence, in addition to personal 
liability for a breach of duty to the unitholders. In contract, the USTEA 
imposes civil liability on trustees who breach their fiduciary duties, but it 
does not provide for criminal penalties.  
3.   Sustainability 
In Singapore, business trusts may not have gained popularity because 
they can be used as a sustainable vehicle. This is likely because 
Singapore’s Code of Corporate Governance requires all listed companies 
to practice sustainability.198 However, the general value put on 
sustainability in Singapore is different from the emphasis placed on 
 
 197. Lee Suet Fern & Linda Esther Foo, Real Estate Investment Trusts in Singapore: Recent Legal 
and Regulatory Developments and the Case for Corporatisation, 22 SING. ACAD. L.J. 36, 61 (2010). 
 198. MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (Sing. 2018) (“Corporate 
governance refers to having the appropriate people, processes and structures to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the company to enhance long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account 
the interests of other stakeholders. Companies that embrace the tenets of good governance, including 
accountability, transparency and sustainability, are more likely to engender investor confidence and 
achieve long-term sustainable business performance.”) (emphasis added). 
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sustainability in the United States.  
While the USTEA may not preclude sustainability, it does not 
encourage it as Singapore law does. Singapore business trusts are 
encouraged to practice sustainability even though the trustee of a 
Singapore business trust “shall . . . act in the best interests of all the 
unitholders of the registered business trust as a whole,”199 While this 
language could suggest that the trustee of a Singapore business trust must 
only maximize profits for the unitholders, the Singapore BTA must be 
read in conjunction with Singapore’s Code of Corporate Governance, 
which “is applicable to listed companies in Singapore.”200 The first 
introductory note to this Code states: 
Corporate governance refers to having the appropriate people, processes 
and structures to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
to enhance long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders. Companies that embrace the tenets of good 
governance, including accountability, transparency and sustainability, are 
more likely to engender investor confidence and achieve long-term 
sustainable business performance.201 
This language makes clear that sustainability is encouraged in 
Singapore for all listed companies, including business trusts. 
Sustainability may be encouraged in this way because it comports with 
Singaporean investment strategy, which is derived from Confucianism:  
Here, thrift involves the use of limited resources—material, capital and 
human resources, and these result in improving productivity and overall 
profitability. In Asia including in Singapore, savings and accumulation of 
wealth through hard work and thrift have often been cited as key strategies 
of early Chinese settlers to establish their own small businesses.202 
This mindset is much more focused on incremental wealth, and 
Singaporean investors are much more risk averse than their western 
counterparts. These protections for all stakeholders allow investors to 
focus on personal gain as well as sustainability concerns, another 
Confucian value.203  
 
 199. BUS. TRS. ACT § 10(2)(a).  
 200. CODE OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 2 (Sing. 2018). Although “Corporate” is in the Code’s name, 
the Code applies to all listed companies, thus including all listed business trusts. 
 201. Id. (emphasis added); see also Thomas Thomas, Singapore, in THE WORLD GUIDE TO CSR: A 
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, Chap.. 45 
(Wayne Visser & Nick Tolhurst eds., 2010) (ebook) (“The Code of Corporate Governance encourages 
Singapore-listed companies to enhance shareholder value through good corporate governance.”). 
 202. KIM CHENG PATRICK LOW, Values Make a Leader, the Confucian Perspective, in INSIGHTS 
TO A CHANGING WORLD 13, 19 (2d ed. 2010). 
 203. Kim Cheng Patrick Low & Ang Sik Liong, Confucian Leadership and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), the Way Forward, 2 ASIAN J. BUS. RES. 92, 102 (2012) (“Caring for others is an 
important aspect of opening up oneself by engaging in relationships with other persons in the community 
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While thoughts on risk may differ, the trend toward good-before-
greed—which is more in line with Singapore’s investment philosophy—
continues to grow in the United States. Like Singapore, business trust law 
in the United States should codify sustainability. If the United States 
wants to compete with innovative markets like Singapore, its business 
laws and practices must keep up with the changing times.204 One step in 
this direction would be for states to add a section on sustainability in their 
business trust statutes. Of course, even without this codification, business 
trusts are still ideal for sustainability. 
4.   Taxation 
There are fundamental differences in how Singapore and U.S. 
companies are taxed, regardless of form. In Singapore, all companies, 
including business trusts, are taxed at the company level and not at the 
shareholder level. By contrast, in the United States, companies are either 
taxed at the shareholder level or at both the company and the shareholder 
level. These tax differences may make Singapore more appealing for 
businesses, but it does not seem to affect choice of organizational form in 
Singapore since business trusts are taxed like any other company. U.S. 
business trusts do have more flexibility when it comes to taxation, 
however. Though business trusts are taxed like other companies, 
non-publicly traded business trusts are eligible entities under the 
check-the-box regulations and may thus choose either a partnership or 
corporate taxation system. 
III.   EXTRAPOLATIONS 
Despite the availability of the business trust form in both Singapore 
and the United States, the U.S. business trust remains pigeon-holed while 
 
at large. It would help an individual to improve one’s relationship when one demonstrates interest, concern 
and attention; and it also helps one to become less self-absorbed and more empathic. Volunteering and 
helping with charity work is something many of us feel that we would like to do but cannot afford the 
time. Looking at ways to give something back to society and feel more invested in it is very satisfying 
and rewarding. There are many areas where charity and voluntary work are involved. Children, animals, 
environmental, search and rescue are some of the areas that rely on unpaid help to survive. Finding an 
area that is of particular interest can add an important dimension to one’s life, introduce one to new skills 
and people and enhance one’s quality of life. By finding positive ways to care for others one adds value 
to one’s life, feel more engaged with others and generate a more constructive, healthy, sharing way of 
living with others. One can improve the quality of life for everyone.”). 
 204. See Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, 95 
HARV. BUS. REV. 50, 58 (2017) (“[Businesses] must create value for multiple constituencies. In a free 
market system, companies succeed only if customers want their products, employees want to work for 
them, suppliers want them as partners, shareholders want to buy their stock, and communities want their 
presence . . . . [T]hat managers should always maximize value for shareholders [] oversimplifies this 
challenge and leads eventually to systematic underinvestment in other important relationships.”). 
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the Singapore business trust has been more widely used. Differences 
between the two versions of the business trust in control, structure and 
enforcement, sustainability, and taxation alone seem insufficient to 
explain this phenomenon.  
Why are the use of business trusts gaining popularity in Singapore and 
other Asian markets? Though observational and not empirically based, 
the popularity of business trusts in Singapore as compared to the United 
States could be based on several reasons.205  
One reason to select a Singapore business trust is that the sponsoring 
entity206 of the business trust can maintain considerable control over the 
trust through the trustee-manager,207 which is often a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the sponsoring entity.208 Even when the underlying asset of 
the business trust has been sold, a Singapore business trust may still 
provide the sponsoring entity with a stable stream of income because the 
sponsoring entity retains shares in the trustee-manager company, which 
is paid administration fees. Current American economic culture, however, 
generally focuses on protecting shareholders from managerial 
entrenchment.209 Thus, the difficulty that business trust unitholders face 
in removing trustee-managers may seem contrary to current American 
shareholder control over management. 
Additionally, Singapore business trusts are uniquely structured to 
allow a sponsoring entity with high a value asset to provide itself with 
liquidity. Unlike other entities, Singapore business trusts can make 
 
 205. As IPOs are slowing down in Singapore, so has the use of business trusts. Also, 
observationally, some Singapore business trusts have performed poorly from an investor perspective—
but not because of the underlying organizational form. The poorly performing business trusts seem to be 
the trusts established with highly depreciable assets (like ships). Those business trusts established without 
highly depreciable assets—like hotels and hospitals—seem to be faring better.    
 206. The sponsoring entity is the group that provides the business trust with assets in exchange for 
cash or units in the trust. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, Singapore Business Trusts – Client Briefing, 
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3c1fc6a5-a0ea-48d6-a169-
afe318456baf [https://perma.cc/YB7P-6PVY]. 
 207. Note, however, that though this control may be popular with entrepreneurs in the United States, 
it may be unpopular with American investors. 
 208. CHANCE, supra note 131, at 2; see also Pho, supra note 74, at 322 (reviewing eleven Singapore 
business trusts and finding that each had a sponsor which directly or indirectly controlled the trustee).  
 209. See, e.g., Jay B. Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory 
and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2010) 
(“Unsurprisingly, many commentators reason that entrenchment, by insulating managers from the 
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control and hindering actual changes of control in 
underperforming firms, reduces shareholder welfare.”); K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Commitment and 
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 745 (2016) (“The idea that good 
corporate governance is equivalent to stronger shareholder rights, while managerial entrenchment 
epitomizes bad governance, has won not just the academic debate. It has also gained predominance in the 
policy debate, both in the United States and internationally.”). 
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distributions to the unitholders210 from “profits, income or other payments 
or returns.”211 Therefore, Singapore business trusts are particularly well-
suited to manage income generating assets with high levels of 
depreciation. For example, NetLink—a business trust on the SGX—used 
the business trust structure to build its network, which was capital 
intensive. Under a corporate structure, NetLink “would be weighed down 
by the depreciation charge and would have difficulty paying out high 
dividends. As such, a business trust structure allows the stable cash-flows 
to be ‘extracted’ and be paid to investors in the form of distributions.”212 
In essence, Singapore business trusts allow the sponsors to turn illiquid 
assets into liquid assets.213  
Further, Singapore business trusts offer unique opportunities to 
potential investors, 214 while providing “a very well-defined and 
understandable picture to potential investors on the investment portfolio 
of the business enterprise.”215 Given the extreme flexibility of business 
trusts in the United States, though, investors may be more reluctant to 
invest in an entity that they perceive to be too lightly regulated (unlike the 
Singapore business trust structure). 
In addition, differences between economic ecosystems of Singapore 
and the United States may explain some of the variance in the use of 
business trusts in the two nations. First, unlike the evolution of business 
trusts in the United States, Singapore business trusts evolved from the 
phenomenal economic success of S-REITs. The Singapore business trust 
was the natural extension of S-REITs since lawyers and businesspeople 
were already familiar with the successful use of trusts as an investment 
 
 210. The Business Trusts Act defines a “unit” as a “share in the beneficial ownership in the trust 
property of the business trust.” BUS. TRS. ACT CHAP. 31A, § 1 (Sing. 2005). A “unitholder” is “a person 
who holds units in a business trust.” Id. Thus, unitholders are equivalent to shareholders in a corporation, 
and are the beneficiaries of the business trust. 
 211. Id. § 33(1). One scholar has noted that this gives business trusts “more flexibility than 
corporations, since corporations are limited to distributing dividends out of accounting profits only.” Pho, 
supra note 74, at 317. 
 212. Mr. IPO, Netlink NBN Trust, SING. IPOS BLOG (July 8, 2017), https://singapore-
ipos.blogspot.com/search?q=asian+pay+television [https://perma.cc/QG98-6LBQ]; see Mr. IPO, Asian 
Pay Television Trust, SINGAPORE IPOS BLOG (May 19, 2003), https://singapore-
ipos.blogspot.com/search?q=asian+pay+television [https://perma.cc/7MUB-U2N2]. 
 213. CHANCE, supra note 131, at 2 (“Often times Sponsors in need of capital have cash-flow 
generating assets ‘trapped’ within their organizational structure. Sponsors may realize value by 
concurrently transferring these ‘trapped’ assets into a Business Trust and offering the units in the Business 
Trust to investors. As such, Business Trusts create liquidity from otherwise illiquid assets and are most 
suited for Sponsors in infrastructure, real estate and shipping businesses, which tend to have cash-
generating assets.”). 
 214. For example, the Singapore business trust provides investors with the opportunity to invest in 
high value assets—such as ships—as well as in infrastructure projects in which they might not normally 
be able to afford to invest. 
 215. Tang, supra note 71, at 181. 
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vehicle and business entity. In fact, the teams of lawyers and practitioners 
who marketed the Singapore business trusts were the S-REIT teams, not 
the corporate lawyers or trust lawyers. These teams were already familiar 
with successfully using trusts in business enterprises. Second, 
Singapore’s industry was hungry for a new trust product to capitalize on 
the success of S-REITs.216 Singapore government aggressively marketed 
business trusts upon its enactment of the BTA. In addition, law firms such 
as Clifford Chance aggressively marketed business trusts as a new 
product to existing and potential clients—both in Singapore and 
internationally.217  
Other factors also may influence why business trusts are generally 
overlooked in the United States, such as the effects of the American 
market, investor acumen, or complacency within corporate legal and 
business culture. In addition, business trusts are not the focus of 
mainstream courses in law schools and business schools in the United 
States. Nor are business trusts studied or understood well among 
academics or practitioners in the United States. And, limited liability 
company structures offer similar benefits to the business trust but in a 
more familiar organizational form to American entrepreneurs and 
business lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
To compete with emerging markets, the United States will have to keep 
pace with the use of innovative business structures. Although business 
trusts have taken a back seat to other organizational forms in the United 
States, the success of business trusts in neo-innovative economies such as 
Singapore should elicit serious discourse concerning its potential use in 
the United States. 
This Article demonstrates the relative ease and flexibility with which a 
business trust is formed and managed, particularly in the United States. 
Such advantageous characteristics have the potential to send the use of 
business trusts upward, especially in a time of non-traditional business 
ideas such as sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility. Further, 
this Article’s comparison of American and Singaporean business trusts 
tends to show that more stringent requirements, which would provide 
more certainty for business trusts in the United States would not 
 
 216. Currently, the industry in Singapore has turned to “initial coin offerings” as the new hot 
product—basically cryptocurrency’s equivalent to an IPO without having to follow securities regulations. 
See Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory 
Responses (as of May 2018), 1 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 41, 41–43, 51–52 (2018) (discussing 
the fundamental elements of initial coin offerings (ICOs), as well as the regulation of ICOs in Singapore). 
 217. See CHANCE, supra note 131, at 2 (listing the “numerous advantages” that business trusts 
provide their sponsors and investors). 
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necessarily impede their inherent flexibility—the main attraction of the 
business trust. 
This Article discusses what might account for the varying successes of 
the two versions of the business trust. Of course, even if the United States 
were to copy the exact structure of the Singapore business trust, an 
overhauled American business trust law may not be able to generate the 
same success as seen in Singapore. However, the lessons that we can 
garner from Singapore business trusts may very well lead American 
entrepreneurs to think twice before passing over business trusts as the 
optimal form for their profit-seeking enterprise. 
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